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In South African law, there has been an evident shift from the traditional approach in 
light of recent case law on agreements to negotiate which have hinted towards a new 
approach as to how agreements to negotiate should be treated. The recent case of 
Indwe Aviation (Pty) Ltd v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd (No 1)1 is a direct authority that agreements to negotiate are not void of 
uncertainty as these agreements to negotiate impose a ‘duty to act reasonably and 
honestly’ although the Constitutional Court is yet to approve the correctness of this 
decision. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal recently held that the mere fact that parties have 
appointed an arbitrator had the effect of binding the parties, as evident in the case of 
Sourthernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd.2 In other instances, the fact that 
parties have given each other reasonable opportunity to reach consensus was held to 
be sufficient for parties to be bound by the agreement to negotiate.3 
 
This dissertation seeks to analyse agreements to negotiate as well as the duty of good 
faith at a stage where a contract has not been formed. An argument will be advanced 
throughout this dissertation that in light of recent South African case law, the 
traditional approach of agreements to negotiate cannot be said to reflect the correct 
position. These recent developments in case law suggest that the traditional view 
regarding agreements to negotiate is no longer an accurate reflection of our common 
law. This point will be elaborated on further under Chapter 4, under the heading 
‘Recent South African Case Law’. 
 
An agreement to make another agreement is void because of its uncertainty, as these 
agreements lack enforceable content hence agreements to negotiate have been 
erroneously treated the same way. The view that is advocated in this dissertation is 
that parties to preliminary agreements should not undermine the binding nature of 
                                                 
1   2012 (6) SA 96 (WCC). 
2   2005 (2) ALL SA 16 (SCA). 
3   Schwartz NO v Pike and Others 2008 (3) SA 431 (SCA). 
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agreements to negotiate as the courts have already demonstrated a shift from the 
traditional approach based on recent South African case law. 
 
1.1 Research Question 
 
The research question to be examined in this dissertation is the enforceability of 
agreements to negotiate. Recent developments in South African case law provide 
impetus for the research undertaken. In answering this question, South African as well 
as foreign case law on agreements to negotiate will be reviewed in order to assess 
opportunities for South Africa to learn or adopt from other legal systems, what exactly 
constitutes breach of an agreement to negotiate, and what remedies are available. 
 
1.2 Hypothesis    
 
It is expected that this research will serve as a warning to parties not to underestimate 
the binding nature of an agreement to negotiate in good faith, as agreements to 
negotiate are enforceable. This dissertation makes various points namely that an 
agreement to negotiate is merely an agreement that parties will negotiate on material 
terms in future, and it does not bind parties to contract with each other, this is a 
fundamental distinction the courts appear to have missed. Further, the research will 
show that there is sufficient authority in South African law that reliance damages can 
be awarded where there has been breach; and lastly, that courts should assess whether 
or not the conduct of the parties falls short of the standard of good faith. 
 
1.3 Overview of Chapters 
 
Chapter One contains a comparative review of South African and foreign law on 
agreements to negotiate. Chapter Two will assess the background of agreements to 
negotiate and review their judicial treatment. Chapter Three will provide an analysis 
of methodologies used by other jurisdictions to engage with agreements to negotiate. 
Reference will be made to foreign case law (particularly English, American and 
Australian jurisdictions) to acquire an advanced understanding of the court’s attitude 
towards agreements to negotiate. In the analysis of these foreign cases, the focus of 
the comparative study will be to observe foreign law and assess whether agreements 
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to negotiate are enforceable or not and also whether foreign approaches have lessons 
which are applicable for South Africa. 
 
Chapter Four focuses on a significant shift in recent South African case law from its 
traditional approach. It will also review academic writings about this topical issue. 
The important cases that will be looked at in this chapter will be discussed in great 
detail as they have shown that the traditional South African approach, as stated by 
Schutz in the case of Premier Free State and Others v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd4, 
is no longer an accurate reflection of South African law. The following cases will be 
analysed, namely that of Southernport in which the Court adopted a more lenient 
approach as there was a deadlock-breaking mechanism; the case of Schwartz where 
the Court held that if parties agreed to give each other a reasonable opportunity to 
reach consensus they were bound to give that opportunity; the case of Indwe Aviation 
where the court developed the common law regarding agreements to negotiate; and 
Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers Ltd5 where the 
Constitutional Court hinted towards a new approach regarding agreements to 
negotiate but did not take the matter any further. 
 
Chapter Five will look at the feasibility of enforcing agreements to negotiate; whether 
it is possible to give sufficient meaning to an undertaking to negotiate; what 
constitutes a breach of agreements to negotiate; and what, if any, have been held to be 
appropriate remedies in the breach of agreements to negotiate.   
 
Chapter Six will provide an overview on the preceding chapters, questions set out will 








                                                 
4   2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA). 
5   2012 (1) SA (CC). 
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2 THE TRADITIONAL VIEW REGARDING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 
AGREEMENTS TO NEGOTIATE 
 
Traditionally, agreements to negotiate have been held by South African courts to be 
invalid for uncertainty and, therefore unenforceable. The root cause of this treatment 
has been in light of agreements to agree which are held to be void for uncertainty as 
they lack enforceable content, hence agreements to negotiate have been treated in the 
same way despite these being different concepts. This dissertation thereafter proceeds 
to analyse and criticise the traditional judicial view and argue it is based on a non-
sequitur. The mere fact that parties cannot bind themselves to agree does not mean 
that they cannot bind themselves to negotiate. 
 
2.1 Cases adopting the traditional view of agreements to negotiate 
 
 In the 1948 case of Scheepers v Vermulean,6 it was held that an agreement to 
negotiate was unenforceable on the basis that agreements to negotiate were ‘too vague 
to enforce as it depends on the absolute discretion vested on the parties, and that no 
such right to negotiate exists under common law’.7 In this case, there was an option to 
buy leased property for a sum payable in cash in exercise of an option, on terms to be 
agreed upon between parties. The court held that there was no contract as there was 
no binding agreement. The enforcement of the agreement to negotiate was refused 
because of the discretion vested on the parties; secondly on the basis that it was not 
the kind of order where specific performance was available, but a claim for damages 
might be sustained if the party claiming breach could show that a contract would have 
been concluded. It is evident that based on the discretion vested in the parties, 
agreements to negotiate have been held to be unenforceable.  
 
This view was reiterated in the case of H. Merx & Co (Pty) Ltd v the B-M Group (Pty) 
Ltd,8 where the Court held that where parties had agreed to increase prices, the 
                                                 
6  Scheepers v Vermeulen 1948 (4) SA 884 (O).  
7  Supra at 892. 
8  H Merx & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd 1996 (2) SA 225 (A). 
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agreement was not binding on the basis that agreements to agree are unenforceable9 
and agreements to negotiate are treated the same way. 
 
Where parties had agreed to negotiate on the amount of rent to be paid in future, the 
agreement was held to be unenforceable as illustrated in Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk 
v Majovi (Edms) Bpk.10 In the case of Titaco Projects (Pty) Ltd v AA Alloy Foundry 
(Pty) Ltd,11 the Court held that agreements to negotiate were invalid as they lacked 
enforceable content.12 It is evident from these cases that the primary basis for refusing 
to enforce agreements to negotiate is the lack of certainty due to the freedom of the 
parties to agree or disagree. 
 
In the case of Premier Free State and Others v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd, 13 
Schutz JA observed that ‘[A]n agreement that parties will negotiate to conclude 
another agreement is not enforceable because of the absolute discretion vested in the 
parties to agree or disagree’.14 In light of case law, it is evident that the basis for 
refusing to enforce agreements to negotiate is because they are not sufficiently 
certain.  
 
The primary arguments against the enforceability of agreements to negotiate can be 
summarised as follows: Firstly, parties engaged in good faith negotiations are 
assumed to lack a serious legal intention to contract, as agreements to negotiate bind 
parties to promises which they did not intend to be legally binding. Secondly, 
agreements to negotiate are unenforceable because they are uncertain in nature and 
they do not promise to produce a contract. Thirdly, the failure to quantify damages 
has been another reason why agreements to negotiate are held to be unenforceable, as 
critics of agreements to negotiate question how the frustrated expectations of a 
negotiating party are to be compensated in cases where negotiations do not produce a 
contract.  
 
                                                 
9   Supra at 233I- 234A.    
10  1993 (1) SA 768 (A) at 775-776.  
11  Titaco Projects (Pty) Ltd v AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd 1996 (3) SA 320 (W). 
12  Supra at 338. 
13  2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA). 
14  Supra para 35. 
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Despite court cases that have held against agreements to negotiate, the major flaw has 
been the failure by the courts to give precise reasons why agreements to negotiate 
cannot be enforced. One could ask, rhetorically, why parties enter into agreements to 
negotiate in the first place if they do not intend the agreement to be binding. The 
second objection relates to the substantive uncertainty of an agreement to negotiate, 
particularly in identifying conduct that is not in good faith. Legal practitioners in this 
regard seem to overstate the problem as it is usually one term that is missing in the 
agreement, an example being parties ascertaining a price in future. Thirdly, there is 
the question of how frustrated expectations of a negotiating party would be 
compensated where negotiations do not produce a contract. Furthermore, what would 
be the appropriate remedy where one party acts in bad faith given that an ultimately 
concluded contract is never guaranteed by an agreement to negotiate. 
  
Although the courts traditionally held that agreements to negotiate were 
unenforceable, a more flexible approach has been developed in recent South African 
case law. The shift from the traditional approach is evident in both South African and 
foreign jurisdictions. 
 
2.2 Criticism of the Traditional Approach 
 
When parties enter into a contract, they undertake legally binding obligations. 
However, in some situations they may agree that they will negotiate certain terms in 
the future. A deferral of agreement on those terms should not be construed as merely 
time-wasting, but rather the inability of the parties to formulate the precise terms of 
the contract at that particular time. 
 
It is of concern that courts often confuse the concepts of ‘agreements to agree’ with 
‘agreements to negotiate’. The same sentiments, namely that this analogy is flawed, 
are shared with Cohen.  She correctly states that ‘the two contracts are targeted at 
different purposes: one is result-orientated, the other is process-orientated’.15 The 
courts often miss a fundamental point about agreements to negotiate that the objective 
                                                 
15 Cohen, N ‘Pre-Contractual Duties: Two Freedoms and the Contract to Negotiate in Beatson and 
Friedman (ed) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law’ (1995) 37. 
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of such agreements to negotiate is to give effect to the process of negotiating, and not 
necessarily to reach a final agreement.   
 
One of the objections to enforcing agreements to negotiate is that parties lack a 
serious intention to be bound in the process. However, surely it can be argued that 
their seriousness should be assessed on a case by case basis. If parties agree in good 
faith to take a series of steps to further and complete their negotiation, the courts 
cannot refuse to bind them to their promise.  It is understood that the parties cannot 
guarantee that they will conclude a contract. Trackman and Sharma argue that it is 
contrary to public policy to go against the clearly-expressed wishes of parties to enter 
into legal relations with respect to certain negotiating steps, and that parties should be 
allowed to give effect to the negotiating process, as contemplated in their agreement, 
as long as it is not contrary to public policy.16 
 
The second objection, namely that agreements to negotiate lack certainty, is also 
flawed. This is, because the purpose of agreements to negotiate is not to produce a 
contract, but rather to bind parties to good faith conduct with respect to negotiation. 
The argument that binding parties to such obligations will encourage a plethora of 
claims by disappointed negotiators seeking remedies over negotiators that have not 
satisfied the disappointed parties’ expectation, has no grounds. 
 
Trackman and Sharma acknowledge that the problem is that the content of such a duty 
is uncertain, particularly in relation to defining and identifying conduct that is 
encapsulated by a duty of good faith.17 Critics fear that judges may interpret this duty 
of good faith differently, leading to inconsistent and ideologically-driven decision 
making. 
 
It is acknowledged that the problem with agreements to negotiate is that as long as a 
contract has not been concluded, either party is free to withdraw from the 
negotiations. However, the traditional approach does not take cognisance of a party 
who engages in sham negotiations; withdraws from negotiations without giving the 
                                                 
16  Trackman, L and Sharma, K ‘The Binding Force of Agrements To Negotiate In Good Faith’ (2014) 
73 Cambridge Law Journal at 622. 
17  Supra at 598. 
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other party reasonable notice or an opportunity to respond; unreasonably withholds 
consent without which the other party is unable to act; or provides false information in 
order to deceive the other party into making concessions in refusing to enforce 
agreements to negotiate. The strict adherence to the party’s freedom to withdraw from 
obligations as long as a contract has not been concluded can lead to a manipulation of 
the rules of the game.18 
 
3 FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
 
Having stated the traditional view of agreements to negotiate in South Africa, it is 
important for the purposes of this study to observe and analyse that agreements to 
negotiate in foreign jurisdictions, in order to assess whether there have been any 
developments regarding agreements to negotiate.  
 
3.1 The basis for refusing to enforce these agreements in foreign jurisdictions 
 
The problem with the enforceability of agreements to negotiate is that they are not 
sufficiently certain to be enforced. This has been held in numerous foreign cases, 
including Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd19, where Lord 
Denning MR explained that negotiation clauses are ‘too uncertain to have any binding 
force’.20 Further, courts have refused to enforce agreements to negotiate on the basis 
that it would be difficult to determine whether there has been a breach of this 
agreement to negotiate. Lord Ackner in Walford v Miles21 asked rhetorically as to how 
the courts were ‘to police such an agreement’.22 In addition, the courts have refused to 
enforce agreements to negotiate based on the challenge in the enforcement of 
agreements to negotiate in the difficulty of assessing damages. Lord Denning MR in 
Courtney & Fairbairn held that ‘[n]o court could estimate the damages because no 
one can tell whether the negotiations would be successful or would fall through’.23 
 
 
                                                 
18  See footnote 15 at 27. 
19  (1975) 1 W.L.R 297. 
20  Supra at 301. 
21  (1992) 2 AC 128. 
22  Supra at 138. 
23  See footnote 19 at para 301. 
 13 
3.2 English law and cases 
 
Under English law an agreement to negotiate is not recognised as an enforceable 
contract on the basis that agreements to negotiate are void for uncertainty. This is 
despite the fact that the House of Lords had initially accepted, in the case of Hillas & 
Co. Ltd v Arcos Ltd,24 that an agreement to negotiate was a contract and thus 
enforceable in principle, but this view was rejected in later cases.  
 
3.3 Hillas & Co. Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 L.T 
 
The material issue in this case was ‘whether a clause in an agreement that 
contemplated a future bargain with terms which remained to be settled was 
enforceable’.25  
 
An important dictum was made by Lord Wright where he advocated the view that:  
 
‘There is then no bargain except to negotiate, and negotiations may be fruitless and 
end without any contract ensuing; yet even then, in strict theory, there is a contract (if 
there is good consideration) to negotiate, though in the event of repudiation by one 
party the damages may be nominal, unless a jury think that the opportunity to 
negotiate was of some appreciable value to the injured’.26 
 
In relation to the above views expressed in Hillas, an interesting point was made by 
Lord Justice Longmore in the Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras case 
where he declared that ‘[i]t is not irrelevant that an express obligation to negotiate is 
part of a complex agreement, but [t]o decide that it has no legal content… would be 
for the law deliberately to defeat the reasonable expectations of honest men’.27 The 
Lords’ rationale was that ‘[it] would be a strong thing to declare unenforceable a 
clause into which parties have deliberately and expressly entered’.28 Lord Wright and 
                                                 
24  Hillas & Co. Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 L.T. 
25  Supra at 367. 
26  See footnote 24 at 515. 
27  Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras (No3) [2005] EWCA Civ 891, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 121, 152. 
28  Supra para 152. 
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Lord Justice Longmore moved away from the strict interpretation of agreements to 
negotiate and indicated the binding nature of agreements to negotiate. 
 
3.4 Later decisions in Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd 
(1975) 1 W.L.R 297 and Mallozzi v Carapelli (1976) 1 Lloyds Rep 407. 
 
In Courtney & Fairbain Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd, the parties had proposed 
that the plaintiff would introduce a financier to the defendants who were to develop a 
site but that they would employ the plaintiff to do the construction work. The 
defendants agreed to instruct a quantity surveyor to ‘negotiate fair and reasonable 
contract sums’ if the plaintiff introduced an acceptable financier. The financier was 
introduced, but the defendants used a third party to perform construction work. Lord 
Denning MR found there was no contract to employ the plaintiff because there was no 
machinery for ascertaining the price except by negotiation. The court took no 
cognisance of the views expressed by Lord Wright in Hillas, Lord Denning held that 
agreements to negotiate could not be enforced. In reaching this decision, he equated 
agreements to negotiate with a contract to enter into a contract. 
 
If the law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (when there is a 
fundamental term yet to be agreed) it seems to me it cannot recognise a contract to 
negotiate. The reason is because it is too uncertain to have any binding force. No 
court could estimate the damages because no one can tell whether the negotiations 
would be successful or would fall through: or if successful what the results would 
be.29 
 
The uncertainty in Courtney was not merely that there was an agreement to negotiate 
but that the term to be negotiated was a material one. The flaw in this view was that 
Lord Denning MR did not explain nor set out clearly why an agreement to negotiate 
was unenforceable.30  
 
                                                 
29  See footnote 19 at 301. 
30  J Cumberbatch, ‘In freedoms cause: The contract to negotiate’ (1992) 12 Ox JLS 586. 
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The obiter dictum in Hillas has not been appreciated under English Law as Lord 
Diplock in Courtney regarded the views expressed in Hillas as ‘bad law’31 and Lord 
Denning MR in the same case held that the dictum in Hillas was ‘not well founded’.32 
 
Of interest is the case of Mallozzi v Carapelli33 where the learned Kew J made 
reference to the dictum of Lord Wright in Hillas and held that there was an obligation 
on the parties to at least negotiate bona fide with a view of reaching agreements.34 In 
both Courtney and Mallozzi, the courts disregarded the views in the Hillas case and 
held that the agreements to negotiate were not enforceable. 
 
3.5 Walford v Miles (1992) 2 A C 128. 
 
The leading case under English law is Walford v Miles where the Court held that the 
earlier view in Hillas was wrong and approved the approach taken in Courtney & 
Fairbain Ltd.  
 
The parties had entered into negotiations which were ‘subject to contract’ for the sale 
of the respondent’s photographic processing business. The appellants were given an 
oral undertaking by the respondent that it would not negotiate with any third parties or 
consider an alternative offer. The appellants in turn had to provide a comfort letter 
and continue negotiations with the bankers confirming that they had sufficient funds 
to purchase the business. The appellant was, however, informed 10 days later that the 
business had been sold to the third party.35 Proceedings were then instituted by the 
appellants stating that the respondent had breached a collateral agreement by 
continuing to negotiate with the third party. At the court of first instance, the judge 
found that the respondents had breached an agreement not to deal with third parties or 
give further consideration to any alternative. The judge held that the promises of the 
respondent amounted to misrepresentation and ordered that the damages for loss of 
opportunity be assessed. The appellants were awarded damages for wasted 
expenditure.  At the Court of Appeal, Bingham LJ, dissenting, agreed that a ‘lock-in’ 
                                                 
31  See footnote 21 at 302. 
32  See footnote 21 at 301-302. 
33  Mallozzi v Carapelli (1976) 1 Lloyds Rep 407. 
34  Hillas v Arcos (1975) 1 Lloyds 229 at 249. 
35  See footnote 21 at para 456-457. 
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agreement was unenforceable and that a simple ‘lock-out’ agreement which provided 
the appellants with an ‘exclusive opportunity’ to try and reach an agreement with the 
respondent was enforceable, hence the respondent was in breach. The majority in the 
Court of Appeal held that the provision of the contract was unenforceable, and there 
was no legal obligation to negotiate. Lord Ackner at the House of Lords held that the 
agreement was unworkable as there was no way of determining how long the 
respondent was locked out from negotiating with third parties, although it was noted 
that the promise to provide a comfort letter was a valid consideration. Lord Ackner 
went as far as stating that ‘an undertaking to negotiate intrudes on the freedom of 
parties to make negotiation concessions, to withdraw from negotiations, or to 
negotiate with third parties during the course of negotiations’.36 
 
The House of Lords based their reasoning on two grounds: firstly, that ‘an idea that 
agreements to negotiate duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
inconsistent with adversarial of party, each party can pursue own interest and party 
can withdraw when it is in his interest’;37 and secondly, on the basis of certainty that 
‘these agreements cannot be policed, that they are unworkable in practice because 
during negotiations either party is entitled to withdraw at any time and for any 
reason’.38 Although an agreement to use best endeavours39 is enforceable under 
English law, a bare agreement to negotiate has no legal content under English law 
even where parties have agreed to be bound by these agreements to negotiate. The 
decision in Walford v Miles confirmed that a ‘lock-out’ agreement was unenforceable 
because it lacked the necessary certainty and that a ‘lock-out’ agreement was 
enforceable only in limited circumstances.  
 
3.6 Emirates Trading Agency LLC v Prime Mineral Experts Private Limited 
(2014) EWHC 2104. 
 
The High Court of England and Wales in Emirates Trading Agency LLC v Prime 
Mineral Experts Private Limited40 found that an agreement which had a dispute 
                                                 
36  See footnote 21 at para 128. 
37  See footnote 21 at para 138. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Chanel Home Centers Division of Grace Retail Corpn v Grossman 795 F2d 291 (3rd Cir 1986). 
40  Emirates Trading Agency LLC v Prime Mineral Experts Private Limited (2014) EWHC 2104. 
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resolution clause which required “parties to undertake ‘friendly discussions’ prior to 
arbitration was an enforceable condition precedent to invoking the arbitration 
clause”.41 There was a particular clause in this case which stated that the parties ‘shall 
first seek to resolve the dispute or claim by friendly discussions’42 which Teare J held 
was intended to be binding. His Honour found that the clause was sufficiently certain 
in nature, distinguishing it from the dicta in Walford v Miles. The court correctly 
noted that ‘where commercial parties have entered into obligations they reasonably 
expect the court to uphold these obligations’.43 
 
The English courts in the case of Emirates Trading Agency LLC seemed to introduce 
a new approach to agreements to negotiate. The obligation to seek to resolve disputes 
by ‘friendly discussions’ in this case was enforceable on the basis that ‘[t]he 
agreement is not incomplete, no term is missing. Nor is it uncertain, an obligation to 
seek to resolve a dispute by friendly discussions in good faith has an identifiable 
standard, namely, fair, honest and genuine discussions aimed at resolving a dispute’.44 
This decision is a remarkable departure from the English courts’ approach to the 
enforceability of agreements to negotiate. The court upheld this agreement because it 
found that no essential term was lacking; that the term was not too uncertain; that 
parties had freely agreed to a restriction on their right to commence arbitration; and, 
more importantly, that enforcement of such an agreement was in the public interest 
because there was an overriding obligation on the Court to seek to enforce obligations 
that had been negotiated freely in order to avoid the expense of arbitration.45 The 
Court in this case looked at the facts and circumstances and found that Prime Mineral 
Experts Private Limited had complied with the obligation to ‘seek to resolve the 
dispute or claim by friendly discussions,’ and therefore the application brought by 





                                                 
41  Supra at para 26. 
42  See footnote 40 at para 25. 
43  See footnote 40 at para 40. 
44  See footnote 40 at para 64.  
45  See footnote 40 at para 47. 
46  See footnote 40 at para 52. 
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3.7 Criticism and comment on English case law 
 
The position in Courtney & Fairbain sums up how agreements to negotiate are treated 
in English law as well as the basis of this refusal. This is evident in the case of 
Mallozzi v Carappeli. Cohen in her article correctly states that the fate of agreements 
to negotiate was ‘doomed in English law’47 in the case of Courtney & Fairbain where 
Lord Denning MR held that agreements to negotiate were uncertain and damages 
difficult to assess. 
 
Walford v Miles seem to have put an end to the debate as to whether an agreement to 
negotiate in good faith with a view of reaching agreement is capable of enforcement, 
holding that agreements to negotiate are unenforceable. This case has been subjected 
to substantive criticism where academic writers have argued both ways, some holding 
that the case was wrongly decided, whilst others agreed with the approach taken by 
the House of Lords.  
 
The same view is shared by Brown, who is critical of the approach taken in Walford v 
Miles stating that this case: 
 
ensures that under English law an unqualified certainty is engendered by 
unequivocally denying any efficacy to contracts to negotiate in good faith, but on the 
facts of the case. This conclusion undoubtedly indirectly condones acts of bad faith 
from parties in commercial negotiations rather than a mere apprehension regarding 
the applicability of good faith.48  
 
As noted by Peel, the learned Bingham, L. J recognised that this approach was open to 
the objection that, indirectly, it subjected the defendant to the very duty to negotiate in 
good faith which was rejected as the basis of a ‘lock-in’ agreement. For this reason, 
Lord Ackner found that a ‘lock-out’ agreement which failed to specify a particular 
period during which it was to operate, was not enforceable.49  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                 
47  N Cohen, ‘Pre-Contractual Duties: Two Freedoms and the Contract to Negotiate’ in Beatson and 
Friedman (ed) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 25, 36. 
48  I Brown, ‘The Contract to Negotiate: A Thing Writ in Water?’ (1992) JBL 353, 368. 
49  E Peel, ‘Locking-out and locking-in: the enforceability of agreements to negotiate’ (1992) 
Cambridge Law Journal 211, 212. 
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Although it has been argued that agreements to negotiate intrude on the parties’ 
freedom, Cohen correctly states that when parties enter into agreements to negotiate 
‘parties did intend to limit this freedom’.50 Cohen, in assessing the facts of Walford v 
Miles correctly stated that ‘the objection that the respondents feared that the 
appellants would not get along with the photographic processing business staff was a 
valid consideration, as this would put in jeopardy the net profit guaranteed by the 
defendants, but this reason existed from the outset’.51 A similar view was held by 
Brown who stated that the defendant’s concern that the plaintiff would conflict with 
existing staff should not have justified the discontinuation of negotiations.52 A more 
interesting observation is made by Brown which should be taken into cognisance, 
namely the possibility in practice of one party using the other as ‘a trap to improve the 
bargain which they really wished to conclude with a third party’.53 On the issue of 
certainty, the writer criticised the House of Lords stating that in applying the formal 
rule of certainty, its application destroyed the intentions of the parties. 54 Hence, the 
approach of the House of Lords permited parties to break promises where they had 
initially agreed to negotiate.55 
 
Cumberbatch56 is also critical of the approach of the court in Walford v Miles holding 
that ‘the House of Lords did not set out, in clearer and more cogent terms, exactly 
why an agreement to negotiate is unenforceable’.57 The writer advocates the view that 
the Court could have made reference to cases where there was recognition of an 
obligation to act in good faith,58 American academic authority, as well as statutes 
which describe the concept of good faith negotiation.59 Cumberbatch essentially sums 
up his argument by stating that the concept of negotiation in good faith, as has been 
noted traditionally, is not so vague as to be incapable of formulation. The writer 
correctly goes on to argue that parties should be held to what they initially agreed 
upon instead of using ‘a dubious absolving power to ‘unmake a contract’ for one 
                                                 
50  See footnote 47 page 37. 
51  See footnote 47 page 42. 
52  See footnote 48 page 360. 
53  Ibid. 
54  See footnote 48 at page 368. 
55  Ibid. 
56  J Cumberbatch, “In Freedoms Cause: The Contract to Negotiate” (1992) 12 OX JLS 586,586. 
57  Ibid. 
58  Ee v Kakar (1979) 40 P & CR 223, Batten v White (1960) 12 P & CR 223. 
59  S8(a)(5) and S8(b)(3), National Labour Relations Act 1947. 
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party’,60 hence the House of Lords erred in holding that the agreement had no legal 
content. 
 
The Emirates Trading Agency LLC case is evidence of the approach which South 
African courts should take especially where there is a time-limited obligation, and the 
intention of the parties should be given preference. Parties should be allowed to 
engage in the process of negotiation. However, drafters are cautioned that agreements 
to negotiate must not be too vague, they should be sufficiently certain to be enforced, 
and a failure by one party to negotiate in good faith can result in them being in breach 
of contract. This case is significant in that it shows the shift from the Courts’ approach 
that agreements to negotiate are unenforceable by giving effect to the intention of the 
parties. 
 
Despite the development in the above-mentioned cases, English courts remain 
reluctant to enforce contractual duties to negotiate in good faith on the basis that in 
freedom of contract and, especially, freedom from contract, it is evident that English 
contract law requires that the parties evince a clear intention to create legal relations, 
and the contract and terms of the agreement must be certain in nature. 
 
It is of concern that Lord Ackner held the view that a party is entitled not to continue 
with, or withdraw from negotiations at any time and for any reason.61 In this regard, 
he assumes that there is neither relevant constraint on the negotiation nor the manner 
of its conduct by the bargain that has been freely entered into. Hence, the requirement 
is that parties should be allowed to engage in genuine and good faith negotiations. 
Despite the contrary view from Lord Ackner, the same views are shared by Lord 
Justice Longmore that ‘[I]t would be a strong thing to declare unenforceable a clause 
into which parties have deliberately and expressly entered’62 because the follow-up 
question would be as to the motivation that informed the reasons as to why parties 
entered into an agreement to negotiate in the first place. 
 
                                                 
60  See footnote 56 at 589. 
61  See footnote 21 at 181. 
62  Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro S.A Petrobras (No3) [2005] EWCA Civ 891, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 121, at 153. 
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Brown makes an interesting reference to Corbin’s warning in the 1960s that ‘certainty 
in the law is largely an illusion at best, and altogether too high a price may be paid in 
the effort to attain it’.63 This is true in that it is evident that this high price has been 
seen in agreements to negotiate that are held to be unenforceable on the basis of 
uncertainty, even though parties entered into these negotiations with an intention of 
negotiating. 
 
It is evident that English courts would rather allow a party to act in a manner contrary 
to that expected of negotiating parties than to uphold an agreement to negotiate, based 
on the fact that agreements to negotiate are uncertain. Certainty is of paramount 
importance under English law. The same view is shared with Stewart that a blanket 
refusal of enforceability of agreements to negotiate misses the point of these 
agreements, and the approach in Coal Cliff Collieries (Pty) Ltd v Sihehama (Pty) Ltd 
by Kirby P is to be preferred.64  
 
3.8 American case law 
 
In the United States of America, the treatment of agreements to negotiate differs from 
state to state. Some states find agreements to negotiate sufficiently certain to be 
enforceable and they have been willing to give effect to the expressed intention of the 
parties. Other states hold that agreements to negotiate are void for uncertainty.65 
 
The United States recognises an obligation to act in good faith as S205 of the 
American Restatement (2nd) of the Law of Contracts provides that ‘[e]very contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and 
its enforcement’. The obligation to act in good faith in the performance of commercial 
contractual terms is also required by S1- 203 of the Uniform Commercial Code which 
requires honesty but not fairness.66 The American academic writer Farnsworth states 
                                                 
63  See footnote 48 at 368. 
64  I B Stewart, ‘Good faith in contractual performance and in negotiation’ (1998) 72 Australian Law 
Journal 370, 385. 
65  Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 2005 (2) ALL SA 16 (SCA) para 14. 
66  See footnote 64 at 375. 
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that the existing contract law is adequate to protect parties in preliminary 
agreements.67 
 
The leading case in this regard is that of Itek Corp v Chicago Aerial Industries68 
where parties had entered into negotiations for the purchase of Itek’s assets by 
California Aerial Industries (CAI). The parties executed a letter of intent which 
confirmed the terms of the sale and stated that they ‘shall make every reasonable 
effort to agree upon and have prepared… a contract providing for the foregoing 
purchase… embodying the above terms and such other terms and conditions as the 
parties shall agree upon’.69 Itek consented to a modification of the agreed terms but 
CAI had received a more favourable offer, and telegraphed that it would not go ahead 
with the transaction.  Itek sued CAI. The Supreme Court of Delaware held the letter in 
which ‘the parties obligated themselves to ‘make every reasonable effort’ to agree 
upon a formal contract… obligated each side to attempt in good faith to reach final 
and formal agreement’.70 The Court found that the summary judgment was granted in 
error. It is evident that CAI had failed to negotiate in good faith and to make ‘every 
reasonable effort’ to agree upon a formal contract, as it was required to do.71 This 
view has gained substantial following. 
 
In the case of Hoffman v Red Owl Stores,72 the defendant induced the plaintiff, a 
prospective franchise of a supermarket, to act to his detriment in the expectation that 
negotiations would lead to a complete franchise. Hoffman, to his detriment, sold his 
bakery, bought and sold a grocery store in order to gain relevant experience, secured 
an option to buy land for the proposed supermarket, and rented a home close to the 
prospective site.73 Negotiations ended when the defendant demanded a larger 
contribution, which the plaintiff refused to pay. The defendant consequently refused 
to execute the contract. The plaintiff was awarded reliance damages, despite the lack 
of a completed contract or even an identifiable clear offer.74   
                                                 
67 E.A Farnsworth ‘Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed 
Negotiationns’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 285. 
68 Itek Corp. v Chicago Aerial Industries 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968). 
69 Supra at 627. 
70  See footnote 68 at 629. 
71  Ibid. 
72  26 WIS. 2d 683, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (1965). 
73  Supra at page 274. 
74  See footnote 72 at page 275. 
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3.9 Criticism and comment on American case law 
 
In the United States, although many of the leading cases involve mergers and 
acquisitions, it is evident that the courts have been of two minds. Some of the states 
refuse to enforce these agreements voluntarily entered into by the parties on the basis 
that they are indefinite.  Some states in the United States should be commended for 
their willingness to hold parties to negotiate in good faith as well as the standard the 
parties agreed to in their agreement, as well as holding the defaulting party liable for 
breach. 
 
3.10 Australian case law 
 
Australian courts have found agreements to negotiate sufficiently certain to be 
enforced. The grounds on which Australian courts have found agreements to negotiate 
to be enforceable should be observed in order to assist South African courts in dealing 
with agreements to negotiate. The leading cases are Coal Cliff Collieries (Pty) Ltd v 
Sijehama (Pty) Ltd75 and United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New 
South Wales.76 
 
3.11 Coal Cliff Collieries (Pty) Ltd v Sijehama (Pty) Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 1. 
  
In the Coal Cliff  Collieries case, the Court distinguished between the concepts of 
agreements to agree (which they refer to as a ‘contract to contract’) and agreements to 
negotiate, acknowledging that a contract to contract is not binding, and found that an 
agreement to negotiate in good faith may be enforceable in certain circumstances.77  
 
This was an important starting point by the Court as these two different concepts 
should always be distinguished from each other. The Court, in reaching this decision, 
took into account the doctrine of freedom of contract as well as the fact that the 
parties had intended their agreement to be binding. What is interesting is the way in 
                                                 
75  Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v Sijehama Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 1. 
76  United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales (2009) NSWCA 177. 
77 See footnote 75 at para 26. 
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which the judge reached this conclusion. Firstly, he sets out the case against 
enforceability: the term ‘negotiation’ contemplates the possibility of frustrating failure 
and does not assure success, the subject matter of the proposed lease had not been 
determined. In other words, an essential part of the agreement had not been 
stipulated.78 
 
The factors in favour of the enforceability included reference to the term ‘agreement’ 
and the apparent intention of the parties as evident in the agreement that it should 
have ‘full and binding effect’.79  
 
The judge, in this case, found that where parties have agreed to negotiate or consult in 
good faith they then need to be held liable to that promise.80 He disagreed with the 
views which had been expressed in earlier English cases, and went further to state that 
the outcome must depend on the construction of each particular contract.81  
 
Kirby P held that ‘a promise to negotiate ought to be enforceable only if the parties 
clearly so intend and only if good consideration is given for their promise to 
negotiate’.82 The promise in this case was found to be too vague to be enforced. There 
was no external arbitrator to resolve outstanding differences.83 An important 
observation from this case is that despite the Court holding the view that agreements 
to negotiate are enforceable, the court, however, stated that the court is not equipped 
to fill in ‘blank spaces’.84 Agreements to negotiate need to be sufficiently certain. 
 
Kirby P correctly held that the intention of the parties needs to be upheld.  It is worth 
noting that judges of late have been adopting the view that where third parties have 
been appointed to settle uncertainties, such agreements are enforceable. Kirby P stated 
that ‘if the parties have bound themselves, expressly, as in this case, to negotiate or 
consult in good faith, they should be held to that promise’.85 The ordinary person 
                                                 
78  See footnote 75 at para 18. 
79  See footnote 75 at para 21. 
80  See footnote 75 at para 26. 
81  Ibid. 
82  Ibid. 
83  See footnote 75 at para 27. 
84  Ibid. 
85  See footnote 75 at para 26. 
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considering entering into such an agreement should be aware of the fact that the court 
will not fill in the blank spaces left by the parties in agreements to negotiate as stated 
earlier in the case of Hillas & Co. Ltd v Arcos Ltd. It is also worth noting that the 
learned Handley JA held that all agreements to negotiate were unenforceable, stating 
that ‘a promise to negotiate in good faith is illusory and therefore cannot be 
binding’.86  
 
Of more importance, in this case, was the discussion by the learned Kirby P where he 
analysed three situations involving agreements to negotiate. Firstly, he states that 
where a third party has been identified and given the power to settle any ambiguities 
and uncertainties, that agreement would be enforceable. Secondly, that while courts 
do not draft contracts for parties, a court may be able to add flesh to a provision which 
is otherwise unacceptably vague or uncertain or apparently illusory. Thirdly, the 
promise to negotiate in good faith may be made in the context of an arrangement 
which by its nature, purpose, context, other provisions or otherwise makes it clear that 
the promise is too illusory or too vague and uncertain to be enforceable.87  
 
Kirby P explicitly stated that he did not share the opinion of the English Court of 
Appeal in either Courtney & Fairbain Ltd or Walford v Miles that no promise to 
negotiate in good faith would ever be enforced by a court. He stated that he agreed 
with Lord Wright’s speech in Hillas & Co. Ltd  that in some circumstances a promise 
to negotiate in good faith would be enforceable, but he did state that ‘the proper 
approach to be taken in each case depends upon the construction of the particular 
contract’.88  
 
3.12 United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales 
(2009) NSWCA 177. 
 
United Group Rail Services is important for rejecting the approach of the House of 
Lords in Walford v Miles. The Court here dealt with the certainty of terms in light of 
agreements to negotiate, holding that agreements to negotiate may be sufficiently 
                                                 
86  See footnote 75 para 42. 
87  See footnote 75 para 26-27. 
88  See footnote 75 para 26. 
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certain to be valid and enforceable.89 Of particular interest in this case was Clause 35, 
the Notice of Dispute clause, where there was a dispute resolution in place which 
essentially stated that if there was any dispute or difference between the parties, the 
dispute would be determined in accordance with the procedure set out in Clause 35.90 
Following this, there was a further sub-clause 35.2, titled the Submission to Expert 
Determination, which held that an expert had to be appointed to resolve any dispute if 
the parties failed to resolve the dispute as required under clause 35.1.91 The parties 
had set out for themselves steps that they had to take if any dispute or difference arose 
between the parties, and failure to adhere to the prescribed steps would amount to a 
breach. 
 
The learned judge in this case found Kirby P’s reasoning in the Coal Cliff Collieries 
more persuasive than competing authority.92 The learned judge in United Group Rail 
noted that Lord Denning MR in his reasoning in Courtney equated agreements to 
negotiate with agreements to agree, a mistake which courts often make.93 The court 
here made an interesting and important observation ‘that to enforce an undertaking 
entered into by the parties is not to interfere with the parties’ freedom to contract but 
rather to uphold it’.94 
 
An obligation to undertake discussions about a subject in an honest and genuine 
attempt to reach an identified result is not necessarily uncertain where there is an 
applicable standard of behaviour having legal content.95 Further, the idea that each 
party must have an unfettered right to protect his or her own interests and withdraw 
from negotiations at any time ignores the fact that a party who has agreed to negotiate 
has voluntarily imposed constraints on his right not to bargain.96 
 
The court acknowledged that the obligation to undertake genuine and good faith 
negotiations did not impose on parties the obligation to advance the interests of the 
                                                 
89  United Group Rail Services Limited v rail Corporation New South Wales (2009) NSWCA 177 at 
para 25. 
90  Supra at para 2. 
91  See footnote 89 at para 4. 
92  See footnote 89 at 26 C-D. 
93  See footnote 89 at para 64. 
94  See footnote 89 at para 63. 
95  Supra at para 65. 
96  See footnote 89 at para 76. 
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other party: the process of negotiation has the effect of each party looking out for their 
own interest.97 Secondly, there was a voluntarily assumed requirement to take self-
interested steps in negotiation in light of the genuine and honest conception of pre-
existing bargain, including the rights and obligations; as well as the facts said to 
comprise the controversy; and that, in light of this, the required behaviour is genuine 
and in good faith with a view to settlement or compromise.98 Thirdly, there is no 
yardstick by which good faith can be measured other than honest and genuine 
negotiation. A question of whether this is done or how a party does this will be a 
question of fact.99 
 
The relevant clause, Clause 35.11 (c)100, was not uncertain and had identifiable 
content.101 Although it may be difficult in any given case to determine whether a party 
has made a genuine attempt to negotiate, the court took the position that the difficulty 
of proof does not mean that the obligation cannot be enforced: the mere fact that there 
is an obstacle does not mean that there is no obligation with real content. The court 
further acknowledged that it may be difficult in some cases to assess whether there 
has been such an attempt to negotiate: in other cases the answer to this may be 
obvious, in others, less so.102  
 
3.13 Criticism and comment on Australian case law 
 
As evident from Australian law there has been a shift, thus parties should proceed 
cautiously when entering into such agreements to negotiate.  
 
As noted by Stewart, the judgment in Coal Cliff Collieries illustrates the importance 
of parties being precise in their agreements and giving attention or stating precisely 
what the phrase ‘negotiate in good faith’ means in their agreement.103 
 
                                                 
97  See footnote 89 at para 71. 
98  United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales at para 76. 
99   Supra at para 77. 
100  Clause 35.11 (C). 
101  See footnote 98 at para 81. 
102  See footnote 98 at para 74. 
103  I B Stewart, ‘Good faith in contractual performance and in negotiation’ (1998) 72 Australian LJ 
370, 379. 
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4 RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN CASE LAW 
 
Having analysed the traditional treatment of agreements to negotiate in South Africa 
and foreign jurisdictions, it is important to examine the recent developments in South 
African law. This research will look firstly at cases where there are material terms 
outstanding; secondly, where there is a deadlock-breaking mechanism in place; and 
thirdly, where there is an agreement to allow each other a reasonable opportunity of 
reaching consensus as well as a plain agreement to negotiate. 
 
4.1 Material terms outstanding 
 
 In CGEE Alsthon Equipments et Enterprises Electriques, South African Division v 
GKN Sankey (Pty) Ltd 104 the court held that where parties make a partial agreement 
and agree to negotiate the remainder, the parties may intend the partial agreement to 
be binding even though important matters remain to be agreed.105 The dispute in this 
case concerned the validity of a telex message106 sent to the respondent confirming an 
earlier oral award of a contract to it. The appellant was constructing a nuclear power 
station and the respondent was to supply steel guttering to support electric cables at 
the plant. The appellant orally confirmed that the contract had been awarded to the 
respondent and requested that the respondent order steel in the interim. A telex 
message was sent by the appellant to the respondent as per the respondent’s request to 
have the acceptance placed in writing. However, negotiations broke down after the 
respondent had ordered the steel but before performance had been taken. The question 
before the court was whether a binding contract had been formed and whether the 
respondent was entitled to its reliance expenditure. Corbett JA, held that the telex 
message did constitute a binding acceptance of the respondent’s offer.107 The 
                                                 
104  1987 (1) SA 81 (A). 
105  Supra para 42. 
106  SUBJECT: KOEBERG NUCLEAR POWER STATION/ CABLE TRAYS 
 
FOLLOWING OUR VARIOUS MEETING(S) WE HAVE PLEASURE IN INFORMING YOU 
THAT THE ORDER FOR THE ABOVE HAS BEEN AWARDED TO YOURSELVES. THE 
OFFICIALISATION OF THIS ORDER WILL BE TRANSMITTED AT THE LATEST BY FRIDAY 
29TH JUNE 1979. THEREFORE WE WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ORDER 
ALL THE NECESSARY STEEL YOU MAY NEED TO START MANUFACTURE AND SO THAT 
THE FIRST DELIVERY DATE MAY BE MET. 
 
107  See footnote 104 para 90-91. 
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appellant contended that material and important matters relating to the work to be 
done under the contract were still being contracted by the parties, therefore the telex 
was not binding.108 Corbett JA held that ‘the existence of ‘outstanding matters’ did 
not necessarily deprive an agreement of binding force’.109 The Judge of Appeal held 
that the wording of the telex was unambiguous, the circumstances under which the 
telex message had been sent and subsequent conduct of both parties indicated that it 
was a binding acceptance.110 The respondent was awarded full expectation interest 
measure of damages.111 
 
4.2 Deadlock breaking mechanism 
 
In the case of Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd,112 the parties had 
provided for a deadlock breaking mechanism, a provision which allowed for 
arbitration if any dispute arose between the parties. The court held that such a 
provision was not void for vagueness.113 Two agreements had been entered into by the 
parties in the former case, the first agreement however is irrelevant for present 
purposes.  
 
The parties described the second agreement as a bridging agreement. It provided for 
the conclusion of a definitive agreement in the event of Tsogo Sun’s application for 
the casino licence succeeding and an alternative agreement if it failed.  
 
The second agreement had an interesting clause, Clause 3, but more specifically sub-
clause 3.4, which stated that if parties were unable to reach agreement within thirty 
days on any of the terms and conditions of either the definitive or alternative 
agreement, the dispute would be referred to an arbitrator agreed upon by the parties. 
The clause went further to stipulate that if parties failed to appoint such arbitrator 
within five days of being called to do so, an arbitrator would be selected for that 
purpose by the Arbitration Foundation of South Africa (The Foundation) which would 
have the effect of the arbitration being finalised in accordance with the Foundation’s 
                                                 
108  See footnote 104 para 91-92. 
109  See footnote 104 para 92. 
110  See footnote 104 para 93-94. 
111  See footnote 104 para 95. 
112  Sourthenport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 2005 (2) ALL SA 16 (SCA). 
113  Supra para 17. 
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expedited arbitration rules.114 Southernport Developments instituted action against 
Transnet as Tsogo’s Sun licence application was unsuccessful and Transnet having 
failed to enter into good faith negotiations with its predecessor. 
 
Transnet advanced the argument that they had not agreed on the essential terms of the 
lease and that the second agreement was an unenforceable preliminary agreement. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal found that although the parties had not agreed to the 
use and enjoyment of the property this did not invalidate the agreement. 115 The Court 
advancing an argument in favour of enforcing the agreement, held that Blieden J erred 
in relying on the Premier Free State and Others v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd116 as 
that case contained no deadlock breaking mechanism, and found that the second 
agreement prescribed steps to be followed by the parties in the event of a deadlock 
between the parties.117 
 
The mere existence of the dispute resolution clause, which required arbitrators 
appointed by the parties, was sufficient to have the agreement upheld so that if there 
were any disputes, these could be resolved. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
‘the presence of the deadlock-breaking mechanism was sufficient to take the contract 
in question beyond the realm of being an unworkable agreement to agree’.118 The 
Court held that: 
 
[t]he second agreement had settled all of the essential terms between the parties and 
was immediately binding, although fuller negotiations to settle subsidiary terms were 
still within the contemplation of the parties, in accordance with the continuing 
relationship between them. Simply, put the arbitrator was entrusted with putting the 
flesh onto the bones of a contract already concluded by the parties.119 
 
In the case of Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk, the parties had 
entered into an agreement in which there was an option to renew a lease on the basis 
that the rental would be determined by arbitrators. This was held by the Court not to 
                                                 
114  See footnote 112 para 3. 
115  Supra para 5-6. 
116  Premier Free State and Others v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA). 
117  See footnote 112 para 11. 
118  See footnote 112 para 17. 
119  Ibid. 
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be too vague because of the existence of an arbitration provision. Botha JA held that it 
was not necessary for the parties to ‘formulate a precise, mathematical criterion for 
the determination of the rental’.120 This case is evidence of a more flexible approach 
by the courts where parties have chosen to delegate to a third party if there are any 
uncertainties in the agreement entered into; in this case, the agreement entered into by 
the parties prescribed further steps which had to be followed if a deadlock between 
the parties arose. It was held that the provision did not lack certainty and that such an 
agreement had to be distinguished from an unenforceable agreement to agree. 
 
The reason why these agreements were upheld in the above cases was that the 
uncertainty or dispute could be resolved because of the standard or method agreed 
upon by the parties, namely a deadlock breaking mechanism. The final and binding 
nature of the arbitrator’s decision renders certain agreements enforceable which 
would have otherwise been unenforceable. As noted by Hutchison, this case was thus 
‘simplified by the presence of a deadlock breaking mechanism in the parties [sic] own 
contract’.121 
 
4.3 Reasonable opportunity of reaching consensus  
 
In the case of Schwartz NO v Pike and Others,122 it was established that where parties 
had given each other a reasonable opportunity of reaching consensus, they would be 
bound by such an agreement.123 There was a Written Association Agreement in this 
case which was concluded by a number of partners, one of whom subsequently died. 
Clause 16 of the agreement regulated the disposal of a deceased member’s interest in 
the event of death. The clause further provided that within thirty days, the remaining 
members and the executor had to ‘enter into negotiations with the view of reaching an 
agreement as to the reasonable and fair value of the Deceased’s Interest as at the date 
of the Deceased’s death’.124 The clause further provided that if no agreement was 
reached the parties had to ‘jointly appoint a chartered accountant to determine the 
reasonable and fair value of the Deceased’s Interest’. If there was no agreement as ‘to 
                                                 
120  1993 1 SA 768 (A), referred to by Ponnan AJA in Southernport para 8. 
121  A Hutchison, ‘Agreements to agree: Can there ever be an enforceable duty to negotiate in good 
faith’ (2011) 128 SALJ 273, 273. 
122  Schwartz NO v Pike and Others 2008 (3) SA 431 (SCA). 
123  Supra para 17. 
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the appointment of a chartered accountant either the remaining members or                                                     
executor could request the acting President of the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants to make such  an appointment and such appointment would be final and 
binding’. 125 
 
The parties had agreed upon a four stage process to give effect to the disposal of the 
member’s interest. The same view is shared with the learned judge in this case, that it 
is evident that the ‘appellant did not afford respondents such an opportunity’ 126 
because the executor bypassed the procedure agreed upon, approached the President 
of the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants and had an accountant 
appointed. Although it was evident that the parties were poles apart and were not 
going to agree, the procedure agreed upon had to be given effect.127 
 
In this case, it is evident that agreements to give reasonable opportunity to reach 
consensus are enforceable and that this can be implied from the agreement itself; it 
does not have to be spelt out in the agreement. The courts have hinted that the 
agreement would be analysed to observe what the parties required of each other as 
well as the time period in which they gave each other to negotiate. An agreement to 
give a reasonable opportunity to reach consensus differs from a plain agreement to 
negotiate in that there is a set procedure which needs to be adhered to, and parties 
need to afford each other an opportunity to adhere to the prescribed procedure. If the 
parties fail to afford each other a reasonable opportunity of reaching consensus, they 
act prematurely.128 This procedure which parties need to adhere to, makes agreements 
to give reasonable opportunity to reach consensus different from plain agreements to 
negotiate, as the former relates to the machinery or process of negotiations, and how 
these are to be reached.  
 
An important lesson that can be taken from this case, moving forward, is that the 
intention of the parties needs to be given effect. The appellant in this case was under 
an obligation to afford a reasonable opportunity to the other members to reach 
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consensus on a joint appointment before approaching the Institute129 and the 
procedure by the executor was rendered premature.130 Based on the judgment in this 
case, a ‘reasonable attempt’ or ‘best endeavours’ would also be binding. 
 
4.4 Agreements to negotiate 
 
In the case of Indwe Aviation (Pty) Ltd v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd,131 the respondent operated 2 off-shore oil and gas platforms in which 
the appellant had a contract to provide the respondent with aircraft and auxiliary 
services. The parties embarked on a series of negotiations with the view that they 
would conclude a new 4-year contract which would take effect immediately after the 
expiry date of the previous contract, being 30 June 2010. The applicants were 
informed in May 2010 that its Board had resolved that it would negotiate only a 1-
year contract with the applicant. The applicant sent the respondent a letter offering it a 
1-year contract, but the respondent did not accept. The applicant was advised that the 
respondent had found an alternative supplier and the applicants contract would not be 
extended. The applicant applied for an interim interdict preventing the respondent 
from implementing any contract for the provision of aircraft or auxiliary services until 
it had entered into and concluded good faith negotiations with the applicant.  
 
The interdict was granted on the basis that in the view of Blignaut J, the applicant had 
established prima facie that the parties had entered into a preliminary agreement 
which was not too vague to be enforceable;132 that the parties had entered into a 
preliminary agreement to negotiate a 1-year contract for aircraft and auxiliary 
services;133 and the respondent had failed to negotiate with the applicant in a 
reasonable manner.134 As to the enforceability of the preliminary agreement the 
learned judge acknowledged that South African law had formerly regarded an 
agreement to negotiate as being void for uncertainty. However, the judgment of 
Ponnan AJA in Southernport was indicative of a more flexible approach. 
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The Indwe Aviation case, as noted by Professor Sharrock, is significant because it 
constitutes direct authority for the proposition that an agreement to negotiate a further 
agreement is in principle not void for uncertainty. The reasons for this being because 
it imposes an implied duty on each party to act honestly and reasonably in conducting 
the negotiations and a court is able to determine whether this duty has been observed.  
 
In the case of Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers Ltd,135 the 
Court correctly indicated that the common law relating to agreements to negotiate 
needs to be developed to bring it into line with constitutional values.136 As noted by 
Bhana and Broeders, although this view was made obiter, it is worth noting. The 
Constitutional Court reached this decision unaware that an important development in 
common law had occurred some eighteen months earlier in the Indwe Aviation case. 
In this matter, Blignaut J accepted that an agreement to negotiate placed an implied 
duty on each party to negotiate with his or her counterpart and to act honestly and 
reasonably in doing so.137 
 
The facts of the Everfresh case are worth noting to illustrate the potential unfairness 
of the court’s decision in refusing to enforce an agreement to negotiate. In this case, 
there was a clause in place, namely clause 3, which gave Everfresh the right to renew 
the lease on the same terms as before, namely for a period of 4 years and 11 months 
and that the rent would be agreed upon by the parties at least three months before the 
lease was terminated. The renewal was, however, subject to two exceptions: that there 
would be no further right of renewal, and the rental for this new period would be 
agreed upon between lessor and lessee. The lessor was required to give written notice 
no less than six months prior to the termination of the lease, of its intention to 
renew.138 However, when this option was exercised, Shoprite contended that they 
were not legally obliged to negotiate a renewal of the lease and that clause 3 did not 
constitute a legally binding and enforceable right of renewal, and Everfresh was to 
vacate the premises by the termination date.139 The basis of Everfresh’s argument was 
that Shoprite was obliged to make a bona fide attempt to agree on the rent for the 
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renewal period as per the agreement; and that until this had been done, Shoprite could 
not evict them. Essentially, Everfresh was contending that, at the very least, a bona 
fide attempt for the rent of the renewal period as clause 3 required both parties to 
negotiate in good faith.140 
 
At the High Court, Everfresh limited its argument to the obligation of Shoprite to 
make a bona fide attempt to agree and that its right of renewal would only fall away if 
the negotiations in good faith did not result in an agreement.141 The High Court held 
against the lessee on three grounds. Firstly, on the basis that an option to renew a 
lease on terms to be agreed is unenforceable; secondly, on the fact that there was no 
obligation on the lessor to negotiate;142 and thirdly, that an obligation to negotiate in 
good faith, was too vague to be enforced in the absence of a ‘readily ascertained 
objective standard’ of good faith.143 
 
The High Court adhered to the traditional approach in granting the eviction order, 
reasoning that agreements to negotiate in good faith were not enforceable as they 
were too uncertain to be enforced in the absence of a readily ascertainable, external 
standard of good faith. The eviction order was granted as there was no obligation 
created by clause 3. Leave for appeal was refused in both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and Everfresh approached the Constitutional Court. 
In the Constitutional Court, Everfresh raised for the first time the argument that the 
common law needed to be developed in light of the spirit, purport and objectives of 
the Constitution as required by S39(2), so that parties may not refuse to negotiate in 
good faith where they have agreed to do so. This was motivated by the consideration 
that courts are under a general obligation to develop the common law by applying 
Constitutional values as mandated by the relevant provisions in the Constitution.144 
 
At the Constitutional Court, the minority and majority judgments differed on whether 
Everfresh had raised a constitutional issue before it for the first time, and, moreover, 
on whether to deal with the matter at the same time. The Constitutional Court, as a 
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whole, appeared receptive to the idea of constitutionally developing the common law 
on agreements to agree so they may be valid and enforceable.145 
 
The minority judgement of Yacoob J held the view that the common law of contract 
should take cognisance of the value of ubuntu, and the idea that people can refuse to 
negotiate clearly compromises ubuntu.146Yacoob J held that the High Court failed to 
consider S39(2) when it ought to have done so, as Everfresh had a reasonable 
prospect of success in its quest to develop the common law in terms of S39(2).147  
 
In the majority judgment, Moseneke J noted that the contention that parties who have 
agreed to negotiate should be required to do so in good faith is in line with the 
underlying notion of good faith in contract law, the maxim that agreements seriously 
entered into should be enforced (pucta sunt servanda), as well as the value of ubuntu. 
Moseneke J further noted that it would hardly be imaginable that the constitutional 
value would not require parties who have agreed to negotiate to do so reasonably and 
in good faith. 
 
It is evident from both the minority and majority judgments that had this argument on 
the development of the common law been brought earlier, it would have been upheld. 
The Court shared the same sentiments that where parties had agreed to negotiate, they 
should not be permitted to disregard their agreement. In light of the above discussed 
cases, it is evident that the traditional approach in this situation is no longer a good 
reflection of South African law. 
 
4.5 Critique on Recent South African case law 
 
Hutchison correctly notes that in South Africa ‘there is clear authority that a provision 
in a contract imposing on the parties a duty to negotiate further terms in good faith is 
enforceable, provided an arbitration clause is provided’.148 Although this is the 
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position, Hutchison notes that the ‘present state in light of these agreements to 
negotiate is more in favour of a party attempting to resile from these negotiations’.149 
 
In analysing the case of Everfresh, Bhana and Broeders (who are critical of the 
majority judgment) argue that two issues need closer examination: firstly, ‘the nature 
of the constitutional duty on the courts to assess and, if necessary, constitutionally to 
develop the common law of contract’ and secondly, ‘the precise import of the 
Constitutional Court’s appreciation of the foundational legal principles of freedom of 
contract and pucta sunt servanda is examined’.150 In light of the development of the 
common law, the same sentiments are shared with Bhana and Broeders that ‘even 
where parties do not invoke the provisions for the development of the common law 
the courts have the power to do so ex meru motu’.151 One would then go on to 
question why this constitutional duty was not carried out in this case. Bhana and 
Broeders correctly state that it is because our ‘legal practitioners and judges are 
schooled mostly in a liberal legalistic tradition which approaches litigation and 
adjudication in a conservative manner’.152 The authors correctly blame procedural law 
which side lines the Constitution and rather preserves the (classical liberal) status 
quo.153 
 
The authors state that the conservative legal culture of practitioners and judges, which 
is embedded in the procedural rules of pleading and the common law of contract 
alike, enabled both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal to sidestep the 
Constitution without even considering whether they were under a duty in terms of S39 
(2) read with S173.154 In light of the second examination, the authors state that 
Yacoob’s judgment, which they describe as appropriate, reveals an understanding of 
the relationship between the common law of contract and the Constitution as an 
integrated one where the constitutional dimension must be implicit in contract law.155  
The referral to the High Court for reconsideration of the judgment provided the High 
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Court (and possibly the Supreme Court of Appeal) with a further opportunity to utilise 
its common law expertise in the process of constitutionalising contract law in terms of 
S39 (2) and S 173.156 The authors stated that in the majority court judgment, the 
potential prejudice to Shoprite was paramount and the prejudice to Everfresh was not 
taken into account. The Constitution was perceived as external to the common law of 
contract and was ignored, despite the majority having stated that Everfresh was 
raising a Constitutional issue of some importance, before the Court,157 and went as far 
as to suggest how the law on agreements to agree ought to be developed. The authors 
argue that the focus should have been whether the High Court and the Supreme Court 
of Appeal were under a duty to ex meru motu to assess constitutionally; and if 
necessary, to develop relevant common law rules governing agreements to agree.158   
 
Professor Sharrock, commenting on Everfresh and Indwe Aviation, observed that the 
Constitutional Court in Everfresh gave a clear indication (without reaching a final 
decision) that the common law needs to be developed to bring it in line with 
constitutional development, evidently the Constitutional Court was unaware that an 
important development had taken place in the case of Indwe Aviation.159 The 
academic writer goes on to state that both the majority and the minority were of the 
view that had Everfresh raised its argument regarding the development of the 
common law earlier then the court would have upheld it. Sharrock states further and 
that the members of the court appear to have been of the view that where parties have 
agreed to negotiate, they should not be permitted simply to disregard their 
agreement.160 He further states that the Indwe Aviation case is significant ‘in that it is 
direct authority for the view that an agreement to negotiate is not void for uncertainty 
because it imposes an implied duty on parties to act reasonably and honestly’.161 
 
Harms, who is critical of the approach of Yacoob J, analyses the Constitutional Courts 
minority judgments in Everfresh and criticises the fact that the Court would have 
referred the matter back to the High Court to develop the common law.162 In holding 
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so, the writer stated that ‘[i]t did not consider the fact that the puisne judge would 
thereby have been placed in an invidious positio’.163 Harms seems to be more 
concerned about the position in which the judges in the lower courts would be placed 
if the matters were referred back for development of the common law. In arguing 
against the minority judgment, the author submits that the argument that the 
Constitutional Court can be approached as court of first and last instance pays no 
regard to rule 16A (1) of the Uniform Rules of Court that a constitutional matter must 
be brought timeously to the registrar, and the notice ‘must be clear and succinct 
description of the constitutional issue concerned’.164 As both the majority and 
minority judgments invoked ubuntu, Harms criticises this by stating that this ‘was 
nothing more nor less than the holy cow with the Latin name pacta sunt servanda’; he 
states that the concept of ubuntu cannot be used as a ‘muti’ which can transform a 
concept or a thing which was otherwise uncertain and make it certain; and further that 
to use this concept of ubuntu as a ‘general cure for all ills debases its meaning and 
value’. The author went on to state ‘that common law does not have rules similar to 
definitions one finds in statutes where for instance, a peacock can be defined to 
include a fowl or a pheasant’.165 
 
Lewis noted that she was concerned with the recent developments in South African 
courts of law because foundational ‘values like certainty in business dealings may be 
in jeopardy’.166 The academic writer does not agree with the majority judgment in 
Everfresh where it was suggested that there was a possibility that a court could require 
parties to negotiate terms of their contract,167 stating that this undermined the notion 
of legality as it begged the question of what ‘pactum’ is. The judgments in Everfresh, 
the author argues, ‘offend the principle of legality and infuse the law of contract with 
confusion’.168 The argument comes across as confused as the author is a strong 
advocate of the principle of legality but does not say that these agreements are not 
enforceable. Lewis makes reference to the CGEE Alsthon case, stating that where 
parties have agreed to negotiate further terms in their contract, their agreement has 
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contractual force.169 Lewis seems to be sceptical in the enforcement of these 
agreements to negotiate. 
  
5 FEASIBILITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS ENFORCING 
AGREEMENTS TO NEGOTIATE 
 
The problem posed by an agreement to negotiate, accepting that it gives rise to a duty 
to negotiate honesty and reasonableness, is determining the content of this duty. What 
exactly does the duty encapsulate, how is it to be enforced, what conduct amounts to 
dishonest or unreasonable conduct in the negotiation process. In other words, what 
conduct constitutes breach of a duty to negotiate, what remedies can be granted to the 
aggrieved party for breach of the duty to negotiate, does an agreement to reach 
consensus on something imply an agreement to negotiate honestly and reasonably? 
The view held here is that courts should be encouraged to enforce agreements that are 
intended to be binding, which are consistent with business practice, and the breach of 
which may cause a negotiating party material loss or harm. 
 
5.1 Breach of duty to negotiate 
 
The conduct that constitutes unreasonable bargaining will ultimately have to be 
identified in court decisions. Valuable guidance may be obtained from the law 
governing collective bargaining in labour matters, and, by drawing from the principles 
of the view of commentators such as Farnsworth, it is possible to advance certain 
propositions about what constitutes unreasonable or dishonest bargaining. 
 
Farnsworth identifies seven examples of instances of bad faith. Thus, if one of the 
parties engages in such conduct, they will be in breach of an agreement to negotiate 
that they had entered into in good faith. The first instance of bad faith is ‘Refusal to 
Negotiate’. This is the clearest example; namely where parties have agreed to 
negotiate and one of them refuses to do so, that party is obviously in breach of what 
they had initially agreed upon. The writer states further that dilatory tactics can 
amount to failure to negotiate fairly. In addition, the willingness to negotiate on 
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concessions regarding matters that are not closely related, can amount to bad faith. 
The writer also identifies another problematic aspect, namely deciding what conduct 
amounts to improper conduct as. 170  
 
Secondly, the writer identifies ‘Improper Tactics’ as another form of breach and states 
that fraud and duress are plainly unfair. The writer does however correctly note that 
these forms of breach ordinarily induce rather than obstruct the agreement. Stubborn 
and unyielding bargaining alone does not suffice to constitute bad faith, but is often 
taken as evidence of bad faith. 171  
 
Thirdly, ‘Unreasonable Proposals’ is identified as another form of unreasonable 
conduct. The same sentiments are shared with the writer that it is surely not good faith 
to make a proposal that plainly falls below a standard that is ‘no less favourable’ than 
those specified in the agreement. It is a clear example of bad faith to engage in 
negotiations on terms less favourable. 172  
 
Fourthly, ‘Non-disclosure’ of important information is regarded as misrepresentation 
and another form of breach. A party will be in breach if s/he fails to disclose a 
material term. For instance, failing to disclose that a previous statement is no longer 
true is an obvious example of a breach.  A failure to disclose would expose a party to 
liability for reliance damages, should negotiations not result in a contract.173  
 
Fifthly, he identifies ‘Negotiations with third parties’ as another form of breach. This 
is a situation in which parties have bound themselves to ‘exclusive negotiations’ 
which obligate one of the parties to refrain from negotiating with other persons for a 
stipulated period. The writer notes that parallel negotiations are not unusual in 
preliminary agreements and are important for competition. The writer, however, does 
warn parties to preliminary agreements not to overlook the importance of specifying a 
time limit for exclusivity.  These are the equivalent of ‘lock-out’ agreements in South 
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Africa. Therefore, if one party fails to adhere to this ‘lock-out’ agreement there is a 
clear evidence of breach. 174  
 
‘Reneging’ is identified as the sixth form of breach. The motivation for this is because 
the common reason for making agreements to negotiate is to prevent the re-opening of 
matters on which parties had initially agreed upon. Although agreements to negotiate 
are not binding and to renege on such commitment amounts to bad faith, a party can 
show due justification if there was good reason to renege. 175   
 
Lastly, Farnsworth identifies ‘Breaking off negotiations’ as another form of bad faith, 
but the author here does acknowledge that there may be a justification in some 
instances for breaking off negotiations. Examples given include where there is a 
change in circumstances or there was a mistake which is justifiable, but the 
disappointed party is not entitled to any relief. In some instances, the author notes that 
a party may be exhausted from the negotiation process and concludes that the 
negotiation process has no chance of success; the circumstances must be observed in 
such instances. It is further noted that where parties are deadlocked, whether the 
parties have reached this stage is a matter of judgment. 176 Although this is not a 
closed list, courts should look at the agreements between the parties as well as the 
conduct of the party to observe if there has been any breach.  
 
Farnsworth makes an interesting point where he states that there needs to be some 
form of restitution where there has been a breach, as one party ‘may have disclosed to 
the other an idea in confidence in order to enable the potential buyer to appraise the 
value of the business and when negotiations fail the other party uses that disclosed 
idea’.177 Courts thus need to afford some form of remedy as one party can use this 
form of agreement to get a better deal with another third party. The party in 
negotiations needs to be ‘reimbursed where the other party intentionally 
misrepresented, as well as in instances where parties enter into negotiations without 
serious intent to reach agreement’.178 It also applies if a party, ‘having lost that intent, 
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continues in negotiations or fails to give prompt notice of its change of mind’,179 the 
court should look to the conduct of the party to see if they acted honestly and 
reasonably. 
 
It is important to note that if a party has undertaken to negotiate fairly, it should not be 
free to change its mind arbitrarily without reasonably exhausting the negotiation 
process. An important point is made by Farnsworth, which is important in moving 
forward with agreements to negotiate in South African law, that it is reasonably 
expected that a party who has agreed to negotiate with another party is expected to 
keep that party informed of relevant proposals from third parties so as to take them 
into account in negotiations.180 
 
Even in situations where parties have not stipulated whether they can engage with 
other third parties, it is required that a party may not be free in dealing with third 
parties if there is no agreement to negotiate in good faith. It is acknowledged, 
however, that parallel negotiations are important in practice for competition purposes. 
Farnsworth notes that if a party abruptly terminates negotiations, especially if they 
advanced by accepting third party offers without giving the other party an opportunity 
to respond, this would ordinarily amount to a breach of a duty of good faith.181 
 
5.2 Possible remedies 
 
The court in Courtney & Fairbain Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd stated that an 
agreement in good faith ‘promises no definitive result, they entertain no material 
harm, and they lead to no determinate loss that is quantifiable as damages’.182 
Although this was the argument advanced in Courtney & Fairbain Ltd, Trackman and 
Sharma correctly acknowledge that although this is a valid consideration, the ‘mere 
difficulty in determining the quantum of damages for breach of an agreement to 
negotiate in good faith is not a definitive reason to deny damages’.183 
 
                                                 
179  See footnote 170 at page 234. 
180  See footnote 170 at page 284. 
181  Ibid. 
182  Courtney and Fairbain Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd (1975) 1 W.L.R at 297. 
183  Ibid. 
 44 
Allsop P in United Group Rail Services v Rail Corporation correctly made reference 
to Chaplin v Hicks where it was held that ‘the objection that no court could estimate 
the damages, because no one could tell whether the negotiations ‘would be’ 
successful, ignores the availability of damages for the loss of a bargained- for value 
commercial opportunity’.184 His Honour, in this case, went on to observe that 
‘uncertainty of proof … does not mean that (agreements to negotiate) are not a real 
obligation with real content’.185 The learned Teare J in the case of Emirates Trading 
Agency LLC v Prime Mineral Experts Private Limited, shared the same sentiments 
stating that, ‘difficulty of proof of breach in some cases does not mean that the clause 
lacks real content’.186 It is evident from the above-mentioned cases that an aggrieved 
party in agreements to negotiate can be awarded a remedy as a result of a breach from 
the defaulting party. 
 
Where breach of an agreement to negotiate has caused material loss or harm, the 
disappointed party should be compensated. The expenses incurred in the conduct of 
negotiations and consequences, such as loss of chance to conclude contract with a 
third party, should not be ignored. A party can be awarded damages for ‘loss of 
chance’ to negotiate with third party.187 
 
Trackman and Sharma, in passing, noted that the remedy of specific performance is 
‘unrealistic in the face of failed negotiations that can no longer be performed, or 
would require constant supervision’.188 This view is not without fault, as this remedy 
can be afforded in limited circumstances, as ‘specific enforcement of an agreement to 
negotiate arises too late to be effective or fair, after negotiations have failed’. 189 
Hutchison also argues that the remedy of specific performance is feasible and the 
court should be able to compel the recalcitrant party to negotiate in good faith perhaps 
                                                 
184  United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales (2009) NSWCA 177 at 
64, Chaplin v Hicks (1911) 2 KB 786, 792. 
185  United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales (2009) NSWCA 177 at 
para 74. 
186  Emirates Trading Agency LLC v Prime Mineral Experts Private Limited (2014) EWHC 2104 at 
para 47. 
187  Ibid. 
188  L Trakman and K Sharma ‘The binding force of agreements to negotiate in good faith’ (2014) 73 
Cambridge Law Journal 598, 624. 
189  Supra at page 625. 
 45 
even under threat of possibly appointing an arbitrator to supply outstanding term.190 It 
is evident that the remedy of specific performance can be indirectly granted by the 
Court in the form of an interdict, where the court can compel the defaulting party to 
stop contracting with a third party even in the absence of an express ‘lock-out’ 
provision. The Court, in Indwe Aviation, granted an interdict prohibiting the first 
respondent from utilising the services of the second respondent (SANDF) or any third 
party from performing air transportation and auxiliary services. The first respondent 
was ordered to allow the applicant to continue providing the services as per the terms 
and conditions.191 An interdict was also granted in the Schwartz case. 
 
The purpose of reliance damages is to award the injured party to claim to the extent 
that he has altered his position to his detriment in relying on the agreement to 
negotiate. It is acknowledged that expectation damages are problematic as the 
existence of open terms may make it difficult to prove what the ultimate gains would 
have been. 192 
 
In Walford v Miles the plaintiff at the trial court claimed damages for 
misrepresentation in continuing to deal with the third party. At the trial court, the 
damages for loss of opportunity were ordered to be assessed. At the Court of Appeal, 
Bingham L J, dissenting, noted that the vendor broke the agreement not to deal with 
the third party. However, no award for damages was made by the House of Lords. 
 
In the United States, the appropriate remedy as noted by Farnsworth is not damages 
for lost expectations but rather the damages caused by the injured party’s reliance on 
the agreement to negotiate. Once the other party has relied on the agreement and the 
agreement to negotiate is advanced, the onus is on this party to prove the loss caused 
by its reliance.193 Brown states that the appropriate damages that need to be awarded 
where there has been a breach is ‘reliance damages or full expectation loss.’194 Cohen 
also strongly advocates that reliance damages, as awarded in Walford v Miles, are the 
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appropriate damages.195 A party should be afforded remedy in the form of reliance 
damages if the other party to the agreement withdrew without any just cause. In the 
case of Hoffman v Red Owl Stores, it was impossible to put a value on Hoffman’s lost 
expectation, and Hoffman’s recovery was measured by his reliance. 
 
Trakman and Sharma note that courts should be encouraged to ‘enforce agreements 
that are intended to be binding, grounded in party practice, which are consistent with 
business practice, and where breach of an agreement to negotiate may cause a 
negotiating party material loss or harm’.196  The writers go on to make reference to the 
case of Lam v Austintel Investments Australia Pty Ltd where it was stated that the ‘law 
of contract should be more than just a blunt instrument which ignores expenses 
incurred in the conduct of negotiations and consequences such as the loss of chance to 
conclude an agreement with a third party ‘locked out’ as a precondition for 
negotiations’.197 The plaintiff was awarded the difference of profit had it continued 
with the work in the case of CGEE Alsthon. 
 
Where a party has transferred benefits to the other party in the negotiation process, in 
the belief that a contract will eventually be concluded, the restitutionary remedy can 
be used so as ‘to put the injured party in the position he would have been had the 
contract been performed’.198 
 
5.3 A way forward 
 
Farnsworth suggests that in enforcing agreements to negotiate, the issues that need to 
be taken into account are the language as well as the surrounding circumstances in 
determining the content of the duty of good faith under a particular agreement which 
involves an inquiry into the expectations of the parties.199  Farnsworth goes on to note 
that in looking at the ‘surrounding circumstances, the behaviour of the parties up to 
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the time of the agreement and the state of the negotiations at the time’200 when the 
agreement was entered into must be considered. This is evident in the telex message 
that was sent in the case of CGEE Alsthon where it was held that the wording of the 
telex message amounted to an acceptance. The author correctly states that 
‘expectations generally build over time, so that the more advanced the negotiations, 
the more difficult it will be to justify withdrawal’,201 and further the ‘previous 
relationship between parties may also be important to take into account as well as 
evidence of trade practices’202 as was stated in the case of Hillas. 
 
The point made above is that a court should be able to consider a variety of indicia 
when applying a legal duty of good faith, including the industry practices, and any 
history between the parties. The overall purpose would be to ensure that the parties 
remain reasonably and honestly committed to the purpose which they had initially set 
out in their agreement.  
 
Stewart provides advise to reduce findings of agreements to negotiate being uncertain 
and states that the fundamental terms of contract to negotiate in good faith should be 
specified, including its duration, the consideration, whether parallel negotiations with 
third parties are prohibited, provision for referral to third party arbitration in the event 
of disagreement, and any other terms limiting free regard to self-interest.203 
 
Critics of agreements to negotiate base their argument on the fact that these 
agreements offend public policy as they bind parties to promises that parties never 
intended to be legally binding. The important point missed by these critics is that 
neither party guarantees that a further agreement will be produced. The intention of 
the parties is to enter into an arrangement requiring that certain steps be taken. It 
seems to be rather against public policy to ignore the expressed wishes of parties to 
enforce agreements to negotiate as long as they are not contrary to the law or public 
policy. In Coal Cliff Collieries, the Head of Agreement in this case contained too 
many ‘blank spaces’ for a court to enforce, and for this reason the duty was not 
                                                 
200  See footnote 199 at 273. 
201  Ibid. 
202  Ibid. 
203  I B Stewart, “Good faith in contractual performance and in negotiation” (1998) 72 Australian LJ 
370, at page 381.   
 48 
enforced.204 Parties to agreements to negotiate should therefore include as much detail 




Having analysed the traditional view regarding agreements to negotiate in contrast to 
recent cases, it is evident that the traditional approach as enunciated in both Scheepers 
v Vermuelen and Premier Free State and Others v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd is no 
longer an accurate reflection of South African law. It is evident through case law that 
agreements to negotiate; agreements that are accompanied by a deadlock breaking 
mechanism provision such as an arbitration clause; agreements where parties have 
given each other a reasonable opportunity to reach consensus; or use best efforts or 
best endeavours may be enforceable agreements.  
 
Traditionally, agreements to negotiate were held to be void for uncertainty; and South 
African courts often confuse agreements to agree and agreements to negotiate. The 
courts, going forward, need to draw a distinction between these two distinct concepts, 
as there are commercial reasons why parties enter into these agreements, and these 
should not be struck down arbitrarily. It is evident that even in English law, 
agreements to negotiate are not completely disregarded as agreements to use best 
endeavours were held to be enforceable as well as those to undertake ‘friendly 
discussions’ as established in Emirates Trading Agency LLC v Prime Mineral Experts 
Private Limited. Foreign case law has shown that in other states in Australia and 
America agreements to negotiate are enforceable and there are remedies readily 
available where there has been a breach. The parties, when entering into agreements 
to negotiate, need to state as much as possible about the agreement as suggested by 
Stewart.205 
 
Although the duty of good faith is open to wide interpretation, it has been suggested 
that the parties themselves can attribute meaning to what they want this duty to mean 
in their agreement. The courts would then look to the agreement to negotiate that 
parties have entered into, in order to ascertain what this duty entails rather than 
                                                 
204  Coal Cliff Collieries (Pty) Ltd v Sijehama (Pty) Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 1 at para 27. 
205  See footnote 203 at page 379. 
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striking it down as uncertain. Parties who have entered into agreements to negotiate 
should be held bound to promises which they have made and not be allowed to 
withdraw unreasonably from negotiations, without any justifiable reason. The reasons 
for withdrawal should be valid ones. 
  
The more advanced negotiations are, the harder it should be for a party to withdraw 
from negotiations as expectations generally build over time; and, as noted by 
Farnsworth, previous relationship between the parties, and evidence of trade practices 
are important considerations to be taken into account.206 The development of the 
South African common law in Indwe Aviation should likewise be taken into account. 
It is evident that, despite the contrary, there are a variety of remedies that can be 
afforded, including an indirect award of specific performance by means of an interdict 






















                                                 
206  See footnote 199 at 273. 
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